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INTRODUCTION
The military has had a presence in America even in the earliest days of its history.
From the Revolution to the War on Terrorism, struggles have ended, only to make room
for new ones to begin. Stemming from these conflicts, are the men and women who have
survived their military careers; these people face a plethora of unique problems, many
regarding health care and other types of treatment. While many efforts have been made,
those who advocate for the rights of American veterans, be they individuals or groups,
have struggled to create a smooth system; as a result, millions of veterans continue to
suffer long after they leave the armed forces.
However, with the growth of globalization, technology, and communication
capabilities in the 21st century, Americans are faced with a stronger opportunity to take
better care of our veterans. In studying the politics of interest groups and policy
entrepreneurs, it becomes evident that, under a new analysis, veterans’ rights can be
furthered in the United States. The political characteristics of interest groups and related
actors, including theories based on usefulness, transparency, and mobilization highlight
potential solutions to the problems faced by American veterans; indeed, some of these
solutions are already beginning to form. The state of New Hampshire can be studied in
detail, as multiple interest group actors attempt to make the state the start of the
cataclysm needed to change the system for veterans.
New Hampshire makes an interesting case for this potential role. Its unique
positioning as the first-in-the-nation primary gives it important political tout. Beyond
this, however, is a base of people, both groups and individuals, who exemplify the role of
interest groups striving to make a difference. Whether these interests are in government
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or out of it, each type of action attempts to change a system that is at a standstill.
However, despite only the best of intentions, it is ultimately found that where New
Hampshire stands today leaves something to be desired.
To briefly summarize this paper, the first section will examine interest group
theory from a literary and scholarly viewpoint. This is essential, as these notions will
become useful in the analysis of today’s political climate. This section will include
research by notable political scholars, and will discuss issues such as the effectiveness of
interest groups, various types, the assortment of methods used by these groups, and more.
Following this, there will be two sections outlining an historical overview of the U.S.
Department of Veterans Affairs, one at the federal level, one at the state level in New
Hampshire.
The next section will continue to narrow the focus to New Hampshire, detailing
the state’s comparative status to its peers; statistics regarding numbers of veteran citizens,
as well as state spending, will be discussed. Following this section, the next will explore
issues and actors specific to New Hampshire, and the various individuals and groups who
exemplify different elements of the previously mentioned interest group theory will be
introduced.
Lastly, in the conclusion, interest group theory will be applied directly to the
goings-on of New Hampshire, and effectiveness will be examined. All things considered,
this paper aims to prove the point that, in order to give the strong effort to veterans’ rights
that is so desperately required, an emphasis on interest groups and other, more nonconventional actors, is taking place in New Hampshire. While this is not a long-term
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progressive model, as it highlights the need for more potent government action, it
presents an excellent platform for takeoff.

LITERATURE REVIEW
From the most basic of viewpoints, the American system of government is a
system of groups. Whether it be party politics, the three branches, Congressional
committees, or the varying levels of jurisdictions exemplified in federalism, the
democratic republic is a system of interests. In a nation with such a strong emphasis on
freedom, almost every American citizen is aware of the multiplicity of unique issues that
are faced, confronted, and managed. Interest groups are one of the many ways in which
the individual, by joining with others, can holster the power to address problems in the
political arena.
The study of interest groups in the United States is crucial in understanding the
system as a whole. These groups are just one of many actors who, through various
methods, have the potential to make a difference in a plethora of political realms.
Additionally, these interests act as an easy-to-access theater for citizens to comprehend,
and possibly even engage in, the system of American democracy itself in order to push
forward interests that matter to them.
The nature of interest groups, as well as the varying opinions of their roles, has
been debated by scholars for as long as American governance has been a concept. While
some argue that interest groups aid in the social association and the involvement in
government, others claim that the division of interests has the potential to clog up the
political machine. In addition to the origins and judgments of interest groups, there has
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been similar discussion on methods used and how these methods have changed
temporally. While these differ from group to group, it is important to analyze the overall
system, so as to understand the foundation of these influential actors in American
government.
At the very basis of the literature on interest groups lies James Madison’s
“Federalist No. 10.” Published in 1787, Madison, writing as “Publius,” wastes no time in
warning the readers of the dangers of factions. Madison defines factions as “a number of
citizens…who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of
interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests
of the community” (Madison 18). Merely from his syntax, it is clear that Madison’s
viewpoint is that factions have the potential to cause harm. This is affirmed as he goes on
to say that these human passions have “divided mankind into parties, inflamed them with
mutual animosity, and rendered them much more disposed to vex and oppress each other
than to cooperate for their common good” (Madison 19).
While Madison’s work lies as the precursor for a plethora of scholars pitted
against a pluralist system, there are other bodies of early writings whose authors take a
polar stance on the role of interest groups in government. In “Political Associations in the
United States,” Alexis de Tocqueville highlights the importance of social association in
American government. He claims that “in no country in the world has the principle of
association been more successfully used or applied to a greater multitude of objects than
in America,” where there are “a vast number of [associations] formed and maintained by
the agency of private individuals” (Tocqueville 24).
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Association, which is defined as dedication by individuals to specific doctrines
and the vigor with which these individuals employ when spreading these doctrines,
comes with three degrees in exercising. The first is that association goes along with the
freedom of the press. In regards to the press, the zeal of association is furthered through
the cohesive formation of an “exact and explicit form,” where the association “unites into
one channel the efforts of divergent minds” (Tocqueville 24). The second degree in the
exercise of association is the power that lies in meeting, where centers are created as
points of power to increase influence. Finally, the last degree is the uniting of partisans in
“electoral bodies” before choosing delegates “to represent them in a central assembly”
(Toqueville 25).
It is through Toqueville’s piece that associations or interests groups can be seen as
vitally connected to the way that the government is structured. Additionally, the influence
of these interest groups is itself furthered by American staples of freedom, such as power
of the press. In an attempt to address the importance of interest groups in American
government, it is key to mention the fact that they act as a way for citizens to enter into
the political arena. By doing so, Americans not only gain a more crucial understanding of
the issues that plague them, but also of the system of their government itself.
Before examining the role of interest groups at a completely systematic level, the
notion of inter-group rationality must be addressed. Mancur Olson discusses the activity
within these groups, and the popular notion that individuals act upon a rational selfinterest. According to Olson, “groups of individuals with common interests are expected
to act on behalf of their common interest as much as single individuals are often expected
to act on behalf of their personal interests” (Olson 96). This idea has political relevance,
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placing its weight into the workings of group theory. Under this notion, individual group
members act in a way that supports the group as a whole, by acting upon the “premise
[of] rational, self-interested behavior” (Olson 96).
In Olson’s argument, he discredits this opinion, claiming that these rational
individuals will, in fact, not act to achieve the common interests of the group. He claims
that the group will only advance together as a whole if there is a completely separate
motivation to do so, and that this incentive must be separated from the common interest
of the group. However, he does make the claim that smaller groups may act more upon
voluntary action; but yet, they too face difficulty working this to the “optimal level for
the members of the group as a whole” (Olson 97).
While Olson’s argument for the potential power in smaller interest groups is
relevant, other scholars disagree with his main point regarding the unification of group
goals. As pluralist scholarly works have become more and more integrated into the study
of American politics, it has become increasingly accepted that these institutions clearly
play a substantial role. Scholars such as David Truman argue that interest groups have the
potential to become stronger institutions if they are allowed to thrive. Truman attains that
“the persistence and dispersion of such organizations indicate that we are dealing with a
characteristic aspect of our society” (Truman 50).
However, despite this fact, citizens are still concerned over the activities of
interest groups and their happenings. Questions over finances, lobbying, and
congressional pressure leave the “impression that any group can get what it wants in
Washington by deluging officials” (Truman 51). In these fears, played upon by various
political advertisements and rival groups, the American public is pummeled by a
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depiction of government loaded with corruption caused by secret groups with specific,
individual agendas.
And yet, if we look through history, group pressures not only have a long-running
trend in government, but also play a part in many beneficial policies. Was the
Philadelphia Convention itself, resulting in the United States Constitution, not an
example of a group effort? As Truman claims, a new perspective is needed to allow
interest groups to truly thrive. Any worry citizens have over these institutions cannot be
controlled “until we have arrived at a conception of politics that adequately accounts for
the operations of political groups. We need to know what regular patterns are shown by
group politics before we can predict [and address] consequences” (Truman 51).
In response to the argument presented by Truman, E.E. Schattschneider brings out
the notion of conflict stemming from these groups. One source of issue is, interestingly
enough, found not within the group, but as a result from the public reaction to their
endeavors. Schattschneider contends that “every fight consists of two parts: (1) the few
individuals who are actively engaged at the center, and (2) the audience that is irresistibly
attracted to the scene,” who can “play the decisive role” (Schattschneider 62-63). The
outcome of whatever cause the group is fighting for is tied directly to the extent of the
involvement of the people, or the crowd. This is Schattschneider’s idea of scope of
conflict and of contagion; the severity of a conflict is tied to the number of people
involved.
It is through this methodology that Schattschneider plays on the previously
mentioned fears of the public. Because of the urge for groups to avoid public conflict,
privatization may be seen as preferable in comparison to socialization. Not only does this
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underground-type of work hide goings-on from the public eye, it can also allow groups to
get their potentially harmful agendas achieved faster, with little opposition from the
public. This can perpetuate a stigma of inequality, where those who are privileged attain a
greater ability to achieve their goals through groups, as compared to those who are
deprived.
One must admit that Schattschneider raises interesting and fair points. Inequality
is an issue in America that has plagued much more than just politics. However, his
argument’s validity only seems to help the argument, made previously by Truman, that
there is a need to understand more about groups and their political activities. By doing so,
there is a perpetuation not only of a system with stronger values of equality, but also of
an American population with a greater understanding of the workings of its government.
In studying the patterns or different formations mentioned by Truman, various
scholars have made categorizations about interest groups, as well as their associations,
methods of organization, and types. Jack Walker, for example, discusses three modes of
political mobilization in the American political system, which he describes as permeable.
The first mode of organization is to “base an association upon a tightly knit commercial
or occupational community in the profit sector,” with the goal of “protecting or
advancing” the economic interests of the group (Walker 172). These groups are usually
supported through systems such as the payment of membership dues, and include
programs such as the American Petroleum Institute.
Another type of political association organization is “also rooted in occupational
communities,” but resides in the nonprofit sector (Walker 172). Examples of these types
of organizations include the Association of American Medical Colleges, or the National
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Association of State Alcohol and Drug Abuse Directors. Walker’s third type of
organization is most relevant to the previous mention of the ties to free speech, and
discusses groups who “tap [into] the enthusiasm and energy of social movements…and
are based on the commitment of individuals attracted by a cause” (Walker 173).
Examples of these types of groups include the Wilderness Society and Common Cause.
Other differences made by pluralist scholars include the distinction between
groups and institutions, as made by Robert Salisbury. Salisbury makes an argument
claiming that a plethora of groups are not groups due to the fact that they lack legitimate
members. Instead, these groups are merely parts of institutions. Again, this is another
scholarly attempt to point out the fact that group politics, which are so crucial in the
American system, need a more refined focus and study. In his distinction, Salisbury says
that “institutions have interests that are politically and analytically independent of the
interests of particular” members of that institution (Salisbury 187). Additionally,
institutions are organizations that are managed and have characteristics of hierarchy and
official authority, with a “greater latitude to enter the political arena,” and less of a need
to “justify their political efforts” (Salisbury 188).
As with any enigma of the social sciences, statistics play a role in attributing
value to the role that interest groups play in the realm of politics. As America progressed
into the second half of the twentieth century, the growth of interest groups increased
substantially. This is important because, as previously noted, these groups give citizens
the chance to see, and even participate in, the American political system. In an article by
Kay Schlozman and John Tierney, it is said that those who favor group politics make note
of the fact that “it enhances the mechanisms of representation, guaranteeing to ordinary

Leiper 11
citizens an effective voice in the halls of government;” on the other hand, those against it
claim that these groups “usurp public authority, [and cause] the boundaries between
public and private spheres [to] erode” (Schlozman and Tierney 202).
While there is clearly an illusion of the growth of activity in the interest group
sector, statistical evidence is necessary to confirm. In the mid to late 1900s, there was an
explosive growth of interest group action, with “40 percent of organizations [having]
been founded since the beginning of the 1960s; in fact, 25 percent have been founded
since the beginning of the 1970s” (Schlozman and Tierney 204-205). Additionally,
interests groups are not only growing in number, but are growing internally, as well. In a
sample of 175 interests groups taken by Schlozman and Tierney, “sixty-one
percent…have opened a Washington office since 1960,” and “38 percent since 1970”
(205).
Interestingly enough, this statistical study is also helpful in shedding light on
some of the methods used by interest groups, and how these methods, too, have changed
over time. Using the same sample, Schlozman and Tierney created a list of 27 techniques
of influence used by interest groups. The list includes tactics such as testifying at
hearings, contacting government officials, entering into coalitions, aiding in the drafting
of legislation, and so on. Although certain types of groups are likely to focus more on
specific methods and less on others, the list is indicative of the fact that there is a wide
spectrum of activity.
However, even more interesting than the types of methods used is the growth of
how specific tactic usage has changed over time. In examining this, Schlozman and
Tierney take the same list of 27 methods and list them from ones that have been used by
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interests groups more than they have in the past. The pair makes the claim that while
other factors have clearly played into the growth of some of these techniques, two main
ones account for the most substantial growth. Specifically, “two of the principal changes
in our larger political environment – the revolution in electrical technologies and a
reinforcement of the nexus between the congressman and his district” have played a part
in generating “entirely new kinds of activity” and in “enhancing [the] salience of
[existing] forms of activity” (Schlozman and Tierney 203).
Out of the list of 27 methods, Schlozman and Tierney related six methods to
technology. These methods included things such as talking to the press and media,
mounting grassroots lobbying efforts, email fund-raising, and the like. Calculating the
mean percentage of groups from the sample that used these techniques more often,
electronically-relevant techniques came in at a 50% increase in usage. Schlozman and
Tierney also related five of these methods directly to a stronger bond between
representatives and constituents. These methods included making influential constituent
contact with congressmen and alerting congressmen to the effects of a bill on individual
districts, among others. After calculations, the mean percentage of groups using these
techniques more often came in at 53%.
In summary of Schlozman and Tierney’s study, the growth of interest groups has
increased quite dramatically, especially in the mid to late twentieth century. This growth
can be accounted for by many reasons, but those tied to the technological boom and a
stronger bond between government representatives and their constituents have been
especially impressive. Not only does this link the growth of interest groups to the
technological world, but also directly to government itself, perhaps indicating that, as
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time goes on, the role of interest groups in government is becoming more and more
solidified.
It is important to note that these interests groups are potent at all levels of
government, not just within the federal government or as a philosophical ideal. In fact,
interest groups can be seen as most active at the state level. In making this claim, author
Anthony J. Nownes and his colleagues discuss the concepts of state interest groups
systems and the diversity of interests that they represent, and the just as equally diverse
networks they act within.
In discussing this concept, the state interest group system is defined as “the array
of groups and organizations, both formal and informal, and the lobbyists who represent
them working to affect government decisions within a state” (Nownes 100). However,
with the fifty states that make up the U.S., it is alarmingly clear that there is no standard
system for state government. Therefore, there cannot be a set arrangement for interests
groups and their related activities. Indeed, the nature and role of interest groups varies
greatly between states; these variations can be linked, according to Nownes, to various
characteristics.
First, there is the notion of the economy of a state playing a role in the capacity of
interest groups. As a general rule, “the larger a state’s economy is, the more interests
groups it has” (Nownes 104). This has to do with the fact that these larger economies
have more firms and sponsors of specific causes and organizations, therefore creating a
more substantial market for interest group activity. Additionally, economic well-being
not only plays into creating a bigger sphere for interest groups, but also a more diverse
one.
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Secondly, political culture also can be responsible for differences in the systems
of state interest groups. To be specific, states with a more “moralistic political culture,”
such as New York, help to circulate the idea that “citizen participation is viewed by many
as legitimate,” therefore increasing interest group activity (Nownes 105). On the other
hand, a lack of or decrease in the involvement of citizens can account for less diverse
interest groups, leaving the majority of the arena to be contended by business firms and
similar organizations.
A third factor that accounts for variation in interest groups systems is the activity
of the government itself. This can be defined as “the extent to which a state’s government
is active in the lives of the state’s citizens” (Nownes 105). This can be measured by
looking at statistics, such as spending per capita by the government. Certain states spend
more on certain programs and regulate more activities than other states do. This is
important, as “scholars have found that government activity often acts as a spur to group
activity,” where people and organizations try and stay ahead of incoming government
regulations (Nownes 106).
Although the role of interest groups in the states is diverse, there are some general
concerns that apply to their responsibility in state governments in a general manner.
These worries include: interest groups not representing all societal groups equally, the
correlation between money and success, and the potential for goal-achievement through
illegal means when issues come down to the wire. However, lobby-laws help to play a
part in easing these fears, ensuring that groups continue to exert however much or little
influence they wield in their particular states. These laws include “conflict-of-interest and
personal financial disclosure provisions, [which] require public officials to disclose their
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financial connections to outside individuals and organizations” (Nownes 122).
Additionally, campaign finance regulations also require public disclosure and act as a
way to limit contributions to political campaigns. These laws do make a difference
despite the variations in levels of state interest group activity; they make it easier for
citizens to find out who is lobbying what, which is useful no matter what interest group is
being analyzed.
When it comes to analyzing particular states and the roles that interest groups play
in their political arenas, New Hampshire is considered to be one of the states with “the
least stringent [lobbying] laws” (Nownes 123). Perhaps in correlation with the “live free
or die” slogan, or the fact that New Hampshire has the largest state legislature, interest
groups are of great number and variety, representing thousands of distinct causes. One of
these causes is the fight for the bettering of the rights, benefits, and quality of life of
military veterans.
In assessing the level of completion and efficiency of these groups, different types
of groups must first be discussed. First, there are traditional membership groups, which
are “groups made up of individuals promoting economic, social, or political concerns”
(Nownes 99). Groups that fall into this categorization could be small non-profit groups.
However, before these are discussed, the notion of institutional interests must be
considered. These groups are not groups at all, but are “non-membership organizations
such as business firms, local governments, hospitals, state and federal agencies” and the
like (Nownes 100).
As the idea of pluralism becomes researched and conversed more and more in
scholarly dialogue, so do the roles of these multiple actors themselves. In analyzing these
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responsibilities, the idea of policy entrepreneurship becomes important. Michael Mintrom
and Phillipa Norman, in their discussion, hold that “policy entrepreneurs distinguish
themselves through their desire to significantly change ways of doing things” in a
particular area of interest (Mintrom and Norman 650). These characters can be inside or
outside of government, for it is not their position that defines them, but their “willingness
to invest their resources” (Mintrom and Norman 651). This willingness can depict itself
through the presence of four elements, which are: the displaying of social acuity, defining
problems, building teams, and leading by example.
In terms of social acuity, the use of policy networks and the understanding of
ideas and motives of others in a policy-related context create a suitable environment.
Problem definition is key, due to the fact that it “affects how people relate specific
problems to their own interests,” which allows for more people to become involved, tying
into the aspect of building teams (Mintrom and Norman 652). This is important because,
as always, there is strength in numbers. Lastly, leading by example allows policy
entrepreneurs to take actions intended “to reduce the perception of risk among decision
makers,” which allows for more general policy development (Mintrom and Norman 653).
Although the characteristics of policy entrepreneurs are important, Mintrom and
Norman also argue the significance of policy streams, or how and why certain issues get
attention at certain times. In an effort to address certain areas of policy, linking problems
with agendas is key in “moving [that] policy in directions [that the entrepreneurs] desire”
(Mintrom and Norman 655). Arguably, different actors have varying levels of ability to
link the public agenda to their area of interest; one’s influence depends on a diverse set of
factors, such as social and political networks. One could make the argument that an
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elected official presents a strong case for policy entrepreneurship in this aspect. With the
ability to push for growth of legislation and public awareness of a cause, Mintrom and
Norman’s argument for incrementalism, or a small series of changes over a period of
time, can depict elected officials as beneficial agents of change.
In a further explanation of policy entrepreneurship, Adam Sheingate discusses the
fact that the role of policy entrepreneurs “prompts us to move beyond mainstream ways
of getting things done” (Sheingate 185-186). Sheingate identifies three attributes in his
rather precise definition of policy entrepreneurship. The first of these is the ability to
shape the terms of political debate. In a more casual explanation, the defining and
framing of political topics allows the entrepreneur to push the policy in the ways they
desire. The second attribute describes the policy entrepreneur as a source of innovation,
as an actor to invest “resources and create new things” (Sheingate 188). Lastly, Sheingate
makes the claim that entrepreneurs turn “innovations into lasting change” (Sheingate
188).
Adding onto the notion of agenda, Laurence O’Toole argues that agenda setting is
something that varies contextually, but that “public administrators should prepare to play
major roles” nonetheless (O’Toole 228). The effectiveness of the roles played by these
administrators also varies, depending on characteristics such as “time, jurisdiction, and
substantive issue” (O’Toole 230). However, as a general rule, public administrators are
able to strengthen the positions they play in agenda setting by doing a number of things;
these can include developing routines that seek to find and address problems, developing
efforts aimed at sustaining systematic efforts, as well as articulating public concern, and
“ironing out differences within the policy or the professional community before seeking
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agenda status at some broader level” (O’Toole 232). Overall, these efforts allow policy
entrepreneurs to narrow their focus to their own specialty areas of policy, while
simultaneously broadening their impact.
In outlining the basic framework of advocacy coalitions and policy-oriented
goals, Paul Sabatier holds that understanding policy change requires a long-term
perspective, as change is incremental and not very often fast-paced. Sabatier’s main point
is that “while policy-oriented learning is an important aspect of policy change…changes
in the core aspects of a policy are usually the results of…[factors such as] the rise of a
new systemic governing coalition” (Sabatier 134). Sabatier highlights the importance of
sub-systems as easy places to identify the presence of policy change, which helps to
incite the important progresses made in individual policy areas, such as veteran benefits.
In the discussion of the fight for veteran rights, it goes without saying that the
U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, commonly known as the VA, plays the most
politically significant part. In the next section, the history of the VA at the federal level
will be examined, followed by a brief history of the organization’s involvement in New
Hampshire, as well as the condition of affairs regarding veteran care in the state itself.

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW – UNITED STATES
Prior to the formal unification of the United States, there were identifiable efforts
to help the people who served their nation. Before the Revolutionary war, pensions were
provided for colonial soldiers who defended their people against Native Americans. In
1636, Plymouth became the first colony to enact a law providing money to those disabled
in these efforts. Thus began the first inkling of American veteran assistance.
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Early efforts to take care of military veterans included the failed pension system
after the Revolutionary War, where only a few thousand soldiers were granted their
payments, thanks to a state-controlled payment plan. Due to the fact that the states either
varied in their interests or their capabilities to take on the job of paying their veterans,
“the first Congress assumed the burden of paying veterans’ benefits” after the 1789
ratification of the United States Constitution (“VA History in Brief” 3). For decades
following this, the Bureau of Pensions, under command of the Secretary of War, created
laws to assist veterans, as well as their dependents. Later to be known as the Department
of War, the Bureau noted that from “1816 to 1820, the number of pensioners increased
from 2,200 to 17,730” (“VA History in Brief” 4).
Despite the increase in the number of veterans receiving benefits, the end of the
Civil War brought in an additional 1.9 million veterans. Of these, no Confederate soldiers
received benefits, until the last survivor was granted them in 1958 after being pardoned
by Congress. During the Civil War, the General Pension Act of 1862 granted benefits to
soldiers, as well as their families, both during times of war and times of peace. Less than
a decade before this act, additional establishments designed to provide veterans with care
based on medical needs were created in 1853 and 1855, adding to the already established
Naval Home of 1812.
As the number of veterans in need continued to grow, so did the Bureau of
Pensions’ efforts to aid them. In 1873, the Consolidation Act revised the legislation
surrounding pensions, and began to pay “on the degree of disability rather than the
service rank” (“VA History in Brief” 5). In 1890, the Dependent Pension Act granted the
Bureau a greater scope to identify eligible veterans by. Instead of serving only those who
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had been discharged for illness or disability due to service, pensions could now be
granted to veterans who were or had become incapable of manual labor. Finally, the
Sherwood Act of 1912 granted pensions to all veterans of the United States military.
As the early years of the 20th century passed, so came the First World War. With
4.7 million Americans fighting, approximately 116,000 lost their lives, while 204,000
were injured. Prior to the U.S. entering the war, Congress “passed the War Risk
Assurance Act of 1914,” originally insuring American ships and the cargos they
contained; this was later revised to protect against the loss of life or injury of American
soldiers by enemy forces (“VA History in Brief” 7). A provision of the Act allowed for
the establishment of rehabilitation and vocational resources for veterans, which
eventually, through the Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 1918, led to the Federal Board
for Vocational Education.
In 1921, Congress created the Veterans’ Bureau in an attempt to consolidate the
work being done by other branches of veterans’ organizations. However, the first
Director, Col. Charles Forbes was imprisoned on charges of conspiracy to defraud the
government, spinning the organization into corruption-based dissolution only nine years
later. With the arrival of the Great Depression, veterans were left even more helpless at
the hands of their government. In an effort to help, Congress passed the World War
Adjustment Compensation Act in 1924, offering bonuses to World War I veterans. Under
this legislation, the amount granted depended upon the length and location of the
veteran’s service. However, if these payments exceeded a specified amount, they were
only good in the “form of an endowment policy made payable 20 years from the date of
issue” (“VA History in Brief” 9).
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In a time where money was a scarcity, veterans began to demand immediate
dispersal of their bonus payments. In early 1932, small marches of veterans began in
Oregon, eventually travelling to Washington, D.C. The movement took off, leading to the
creation of a force of veterans known as the Bonus Expeditionary Forces. With the quick
growth in numbers, came a deterioration of living conditions as the groups travelled
along. In an effort to battle concerns about disease, the Veterans Administration, which
had been established in 1930 to unite the Veterans’ Bureau, the Bureau of Pensions, and
the National Homes for Disabled Volunteer Soldiers, built and opened an emergency
hospital.
With violence escalating, especially after the failure of a bill addressing the
immediate dispersal of payments in June, marching veterans became angry and violence
began to escalate. President Hoover ordered General MacArthur to use force to remove
about 3,500 veterans, and bricks and clubs injured many, although no gunshots were
fired. Although Congress approved VA-funded transportation for these marchers, early
payments were not dispersed until five years later, in June of 1937.
Following the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 and the American entry into World
War II, many VA workers were called upon or volunteered for service in the military. In
an effort to re-staff these open positions, minimum age and physical requirements were
reduced. Ultimately this lead to a “drain on VA hospital staffs [that] came at the same
time as a rapid increase in the number of veterans needing immediate medical treatment”
(“VA History in Brief” 13). Despite this struggle, public sentiment to aid in the transition
of American soldiers of Word War II back into domestic life was strong. In response to
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this, Congress came up with the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act in 1944, better known
as the GI Bill.
Signed into law by President Roosevelt in June of that year, the law was
composed of three main parts. The first granted veterans up to four years of education or
job training, including money for fees, and also a monthly subsistence. The second
provision gave veterans home, farm, or business loans, federally funded and with no
down payment. Lastly, unemployment compensation was also provided for a period of up
to 52 weeks. The GI Bill was greatly received by veterans and civilians alike, and granted
the very real possibility of “higher education and home ownership…[to] millions of
veterans and their families,” therefore contributing “more than any other program in
history to [their] welfare, and to the growth of the nation’s economy” (“VA History in
Brief” 14).
Perhaps in the relation to the plethora of WWII veterans returning home with a
need for prosthetics, the years following the war were focused on the advancement of
medical care for veterans. With the retirement of longtime VA administrator Frank Hines
came his replacement, General Omar Bradley, who brought on chief surgeon Major
General Paul Hawley to oversee VA medicine. Hawley’s efforts included “the formation
of a separate department of medicine, outpatient treatment for veterans with disabilities
not related to military service, and the creation of resident and teaching fellowships in
VA hospitals,” as well as “a policy of affiliating new VA hospitals with medical schools”
(“VA History in Brief” 15). Despite Hawley’s efforts to open almost one hundred more
hospitals, the increase in veteran claims caused existing hospitals to be filled to the brim,
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with waiting lists being created for new establishments. In an effort to deal with this, VA
staff was increased.
With the dawn of the new decade came the Korean Conflict in June of 1950. In
1952, a Korean GI Bill, formally called the Veterans’ Readjustment Assistance Act, was
formulated. The Act provided many of the same benefits as the original GI Bill did,
except for the fact that it reduced financial education benefits and imposed new
restrictions, such as a shorter lengths of time for education for veterans to access after the
war.
Due to the ever-increasing flow of patients, the VA reorganized into three
departments in 1953 to tackle different issues; these departments were the Department of
Medicine and Surgery, the Department of Veterans Benefits, and the Department of
Insurance. Towards the end of the decade, the first of these departments focused on
addressing chronic-care problems of aged veterans, which Congress agreed was an
important issue.
With the end of the Vietnam War came a new wave of troubles for veterans who
returned home. With a strong anti-war movement, the “culture shock of suddenly being
back in civilian life caused veterans greater adjustment difficulties,” and “many veterans
reported feeling isolated and alienated from their peers, and society in general” (“VA
History in Brief” 18). In response to these issues, Congress passed the Veterans’
Readjustment Benefits Act in 1966, bringing back the previous strength of veterans’
educational benefits. About 76% of eligible veterans participated in the Vietnam GI Bill’s
educational program, compared to 50.5% and 43.4% of veterans from World War II and
the Korean Conflict, respectively. Additionally, Servicemen’s Group Life Insurance was
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established when the VA purchased a group policy from a commercial insurance
company, granting veterans more benefits and options than they previously had.
This was also the time where the VA began to expand in ways that were crucial,
but not related to direct policies. New measures of outreach were created, aimed at
informing veterans of their benefits. The VA created veterans assistance centers, and
placed them in 21 cities in the mid 1960s, in order to assist servicemembers both before
and after discharge, run telephone services, direct counseling services, and keep in
contact with other centers and with stationed military personnel.
However, in other areas, VA care took a relatively long time to keep up with the
special needs of Vietnam veterans. Agent Orange exposure has been linked to causes of a
plethora of diseases, such as various cancers and liver diseases. In the late 1970s and
early 1980s, VA care for Vietnam vets with unidentified health reasons was minimal, and
Agent Orange-specific claims only were allowed for complaints of skin rashes. In 1991,
claims for various sarcomas and non-Hodgkin’s lymphomas were accepted, but veterans
suffering from Hodgkin’s disease, a liver disease known as porphyria cutanea tarda, and
various respiratory cancers, weren’t granted disability payments until 1993.
In 1978, Congress passed the Veterans’ and Survivors’ Pension Improvement Act
to help deal with the rising number of veterans, as those who fought in World War II
grew closer to reaching their pension payments. Under this law, the total of all family
members’ income was counted towards eligibility. Because of this, many World War II
veterans were not entitled to pensions.
In 1979, Vet Centers were set up across the United States, providing services in
counseling, especially for veterans with post-traumatic stress disorder. Originally
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intended to take care of the special needs of Vietnam veterans, these became open to
veterans of Middle Eastern wars in 1991, and veterans of World War II and Korea in
1996.
In the late part of the twentieth century, the debate about the potential elevation of
the VA to Cabinet-level status peaked. Those who supported this movement shared
arguments that were based upon the size and scope of the VA; backers claimed that it was
“the largest independent federal agency in terms of budget and was second only to the
Defense Department in the number of employees,” and that “one-third of the U.S.
population was eligible for veterans benefits” (“VA History in Brief” 26). With President
Reagan’s signature on March 15, 1989, the VA officially became the Department of
Veterans Affairs.
Compared with the anti-war sentiment that surrounded the Vietnam War, when
the Persian Gulf War commenced in 1990, military personnel overall found themselves
part of a nation that supported them and the strengthening of their benefits. In 1991,
Congress passed the Persian Gulf Supplemental Authorization and Personnel Benefits
Act, which determined that the conflict was a war, by the standards used to determine
eligibility for veterans’ benefits.
Near the turn of the century, the scope of veteran medical care began to grow,
with combat veterans becoming eligible for free VA care, as well as care from outpatient
centers or nursing homes. Additionally, in 2001, family coverage became available under
the aforementioned Servicememebers’ Group Life Insurance provided by the VA.
Following this, a three-year process known as Capital Asset Realignment for Enhanced
Services, or CARES, brought in more hospitals, spinal cord injury centers, clinics, and
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other medical centers to help with changes in the “geographic concentrations of veterans
and new methods of medical treatment” (VA History in Brief” 30).
Despite the comprehensive and seemingly proactive history of the VA, it appears
that today the organization is clouded in connotations of scandal and deceit. In fact, it can
be argued that “scandal, controversy, and veterans care in the United States have gone
hand-in-hand for virtually as long as there’s been a republic” (Pearson 1). Indeed,
following the end of the Revolutionary War, only a few thousand veterans received
payments that were promised to all soldiers by Congress.
What can be determined as the start of modern-day VA scandal occurred in 1930,
when the Veterans Bureau, which was the then-current organization that aimed to grant
benefits to World War I veterans, was abolished after only nine years. Following the
establishment of the Veterans Administration, care was still lagging, as can be seen with
the struggle of the Bonus Expeditionary Forces, who were left with no other option than
to march to Washington for the payment of their promised bonuses. Despite this, the
straggling productivity of the VA prevailed, and marchers were literally forced out of
Washington, made to wait a whole five years for payments to start.
These medical and hospital related problems that the VA seems to be known for
today continued in 1945, when the then-Administrator of the VA, Frank Hines, resigned
amidst a series of reports discussing the shoddy care system found in VA hospitals. After
a few more decades filled with Administrator resignations and veteran frustrations on
lacking care with issues such as Agent Orange complication in Vietnam veterans,
President Nixon launched a formal investigation into the VA in 1974. Things intensified
after Vietnam veteran Ron Kovic launched a well-publicized hunger strike to protest the
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poor treatment of veterans in the VA hospital system, claiming that he and many others
“gave America [their] all, and the leaders of this government threw [them] away to rot in
their VA hospitals” (Pearson 4). Shortly after, in 1976, more investigations into VA
hospitals in Denver and New Orleans found great amounts of shortcomings in VA care.
Events and investigations similar to these continued throughout the end of the
twentieth century. Some notable instances can be seen; one example includes the office
of the VA Inspector General’s 1986 finding that 93 working VA physicians had sanctions
against their licenses to practice medicine. In a 1991 publication by the Chicago Tribune,
it was found that VA doctors in the city were known to ignore test results, fail to treat
patients efficiently and punctually, and even to perform surgeries that were unnecessary.
These problems were not all related to specific VA hospitals, either. In 2000, the
U.S. Government Accountability Office found what it deemed “substantial problems”
with the VA, including their handling of research trials that involved human subjects.
Another finding of the GAO a mere year later addressed the failure of a 1995 goal to
reduce the vast waiting period for primary care and specialty appointments. While
veterans were supposed to have access to these appointments within 30 days of
scheduling, it was found that they were still made to wait more than two months on
average. In 2003, a special commission under the Bush Administration found that
approximately 236,000 veterans had been waiting six months or more for follow-up
visits, once again indicating the severe backlogging problem suffered by the VA.
Problems with the VA in the early 2000s gained extensive media coverage. In
2006, a severe breach of security occurred when the names and Social Security numbers
of approximately 26.5 million veterans were stolen from the home of a VA worker, who
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was not authorized to handle the materials. A year later, it was found that despite the
backup of thousands of veterans’ cases, numerous bad reviews, and other horror stories
plaguing VA hospitals, multiple VA officials were receiving bonuses of upwards of
$33,000 a year.
Medical care continued to be a problem in 2009, when the VA officially disclosed
that about 10,000 veterans from the states of Tennessee, Florida, and Georgia who
underwent routine colonoscopies were exposed to viral infections; 37 patients were tested
positive for hepatitis and six for HIV. Two years later in 2011, nine veterans in Ohio also
tested positive for hepatitis, but this time after receiving dental care. Following an
investigation, it was found that “a dentist at the VA medical center [in Ohio]
acknowledged not washing his hands or even changing gloves between patients for 18
years” (Pearson 7). Disease continued to be an issue, as a VA hospital in Pennsylvania
suffered from an outbreak of Legionnaires’ Disease, which took the lives of at least five
veterans over the course of the next two years.
Legal and governmental investigations also continued to plague the VA. In 2013,
a VA Director was indicted on charges of taking bribes to grant VA contracts to a
specific company. In April of the following year, a high-profile scandal at the Phoenix
Veterans Affairs Health Care system took place when it was discovered that at least forty
veterans passed away while waiting for appointments. Upon investigation, it was found
that these patients were on secret lists that aimed to hide the lengthy delays from
Washington officials. The next month, emails were discovered that indicated a VA
employee out of Cheyenne, Wyoming was manipulating the system, also to cover up long
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waiting times. Around the same time, similar situations continued to arise in San
Antonio, Texas and in Durham, North Carolina.
Inspection into VA-related scandal makes it very clear that the organization has a
serious problem in providing adequate, timely, and sanitary care to the veterans of the
United States. Regretfully, what was supposed to be a strong-armed friend of veterans
has come to be seen as a group that causes much more harm than it should. Not to say
that all VA action is negative by any means, but it is clear that veterans of the armed
services deserve more – but where and who this comes from is yet to be seen.

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW – NEW HAMPSHIRE
State-funded care for New Hampshire veterans has existed since the late 1800s. In
1875, the New Hampshire Veterans Association was formed with the first reunion of
veterans of the Civil War in Manchester, New Hampshire. After an additional meeting in
1878 at what was then known as Weirs Landing, land was “made available to the New
Hampshire Veteran’s Association at the Weirs for 43 years” (“History”). This land was
granted by the Boston, Concord, & Montreal Railroad. Finally, in 1881, the New
Hampshire VA was formally incorporated by the state, with a temporary headquarters
being established, until a formal one was constructed in 1885.
In terms of structural integrity of the Association, the early-to-mid twentieth
century brought a fair amount of destruction. In 1924, a fire struck The Weirs, and
destroyed the 3rd Regiment Building. Following this, a strike of lightning destroyed the
Civil War Soldier statue that had been erected on New Hampshire Ave. in 1894. Yet
again, in 1938, Association property was ruined by a hurricane that “destroyed the 8th and
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13th Regiment Building, National Veterans Association Building [and] the Convention
Pavilion,” among others (“New Hampshire Veterans Association History”). This theme
of devastation continued into the later part of the century, where fires destroyed buildings
in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s.
At the same time of the introduction of the New Hampshire Veterans Association
came the birth of the New Hampshire Veterans Home. Aimed at a more medical-based
means of aid, “the first legislation directing assistance in establishing and providing
operational costs for state-operated Soldiers’ Homes was passed by Congress in 1888”
(“Fun Facts and History”). In 1889, New Hampshire Governor David H. Goodell formed
a Board of Managers, comprised of prestigious citizens of New Hampshire, with the goal
of choosing a location to establish a home for veterans in need. Charles E. Tilton, a
member of the board himself, offered a 30-acre plot, known as Savage Farm. This offer
was accepted on November 8, 1889, with dedicating ceremonies taking place on
December 3 of the next year. Three days following these ceremonies, the home admitted
its first veterans of the Civil War.

NEW HAMPSHIRE’S COMPARATIVE STATUS
The connotations surrounding current veteran care in the United States are not
usually ones that are associated with beneficial, helpful services. As previously
mentioned, there have been outbreaks of scandal across the country in various state-run
veteran hospitals that bring outrage and anger to the public, as well as continued
frustration to the millions of veterans trying to access benefits that they rightfully
deserve.
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In terms of figuring out where exactly New Hampshire lands in terms of the
desolation of veteran care, it is helpful to compare where the state stands among its peers.
In an analysis conducted by John Kiernan of Evolution Finance, each state and the
District of Colombia was rated one through fifty-one for which was most “conducive to a
comfortable military retirement” (Kiernan). Criteria used included: veterans per capita,
job opportunities for veterans, the number of specific types of health facilities, and more.
In the rankings, New Hampshire was rated number seven out of fifty-one. In comparison
to the worst-case scenario, Rhode Island was ranked last.
In an order to compare these cases more closely, looking at specific government
studies is key. In 2016, the National Center for Veterans Analysis and Statistics, under
the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, published summary reports on each of the
states, detailing quantitative information regarding veteran care and benefits. First, in
addressing the situation in Rhode Island, the 2015 VA expenditures totaled 0.55 billion
dollars, and funded large categories such as compensation and pensions, medical care,
education and vocational rehabilitation and employment, general operating expenses, and
the like. In the state, there are an estimated 70,000 veterans, with 36,000 being the age of
65 years or older. Looking at facilities, there is one inpatient care site and three outpatient
care sites. Out of the 70,000 veterans in the state, 11,951 receive compensation for
disability, 886 receive pensions, and 1,164 are Dependency and Indemnity
Compensation, or DIC, beneficiaries. In regards to health care, 28,210 of the 8,965,923
veterans enrolled in the VA health care system in the United States live in Rhode Island.
In comparison, New Hampshire’s total expenditures for the same year fell at 0.7
billion dollars for the same categories. New Hampshire came in at an estimated 111,000
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veterans, with 53,000 being 65 years or older. Like Rhode Island, New Hampshire has
one inpatient care site, but has seven outpatient care sites. 18,544 of those New
Hampshire veterans receive disability compensation, 903 receive pensions, and 1,561 are
DIC beneficiaries. 43,767 New Hampshire veterans, out of the previously mentioned
national total, are enrolled in the VA health care system.
When it comes to spending, New Hampshire spent more in nearly every category
than Rhode Island did. Although this can be accounted for by the difference in budget,
there were some areas where Rhode Island did spend more. In terms of general operating
expenses, Rhode Island spent $25,055 in 2015, while New Hampshire spent only $6,587.
This is interesting to note, as New Hampshire has seven outpatient care sites and two vet
centers, compared to the three outpatient canters and one vet center of Rhode Island’s.
Additionally, Rhode Island spent $2,427 on construction in 2015, while New Hampshire
spent $555. While these numbers themselves are not conclusive, it does seem that
continuance of general upkeep and operation seem like worthy causes to maintaining a
beneficial veteran system.
Going past finances and looking at the services themselves, the number of
beneficiaries in the two states seems relatively close, especially when a 40,000-veteran
difference separates the two states. For having 40,000 more veterans in the state, New
Hampshire only has 17 more veterans receiving pension than Rhode Island does, and
only 397 more beneficiaries of DIC.
While New Hampshire does have more resource centers for veterans to use, a
bigger overall budget, and more veterans enrolled in the VA health care system, it is
evident that, when compared with a struggling state such as Rhode Island, the disparity
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between the two is not enormous. Although New Hampshire has not suffered from any
crippling reports about its system, such as other states like Arizona, Pennsylvania,
Tennessee, and Georgia, it can be seen that there is definitely room for improvement.
Following a national audit in 2014, the New Hampshire Veteran Affairs system,
ran out of Manchester, was not red flagged. However, follow-up reports by other sources,
such as news station WMUR, show that there is still need to help New Hampshire
veterans. While “the mostly positive report on the VA in Manchester meant it wasn’t
linked with a wider national scandal over veterans dying as they waited for medical
care,” there are still examples of inadequacy, as with retired Air Force Major Jim Dwyer,
who was on a waiting list for 17 months (Sexton 1).
In terms of national averages, New Hampshire had about 500 out of 20,000
scheduled appoints with veterans waiting longer than 30 days to see a physician. This
comes out to two percent, with the national average being four percent. But while New
Hampshire statistically is faring better than other states, the waits themselves have proved
to be individually trying for people who deserve a timely system of care.

NEW HAMPSHIRE TODAY – ISSUES AND ACTORS
As previously stated, most American connotations of the VA are not overly
positive, with no shortage of striking stories on malpractice, negligence, and highly-paid,
highly criticized officials. While these problems have not plagued the state of New
Hampshire quite as severely as they have in other states, New Hampshire has had its fair
share of controversy. In March 2016, problems that afflicted VA centers all over the
country made their way to the Granite State with the release of a report by the VA Office
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of Inspector General. The report, which focused on the Manchester VA Medical Center,
and the Medical Center in White River Junction, Vermont, claimed that the centers
“manipulated records to make wait times for appointments appear shorter than they
actually were” (Biello). In the case of the Manchester VA, some veterans were waiting as
long as a year for access to some treatments, and there were some, albeit unsubstantiated,
claims of the existence of secret waiting lists. Although no veteran made reports of harm
at the hospital, the report brought to attention the need for further work within the state.
Following the release of the report, New Hampshire Senator Kelly Ayotte began
to attend regular meetings with the Director of the Manchester VA Medical Center,
Danielle Ocker. According to Ocker, newly made Director in May 2015, these scheduling
issues described in the report preceded her tenure, and are being repaired by “procedures
that have been since put into place prior to her arrival, as well as more recent efforts”
(Alden). In their discussion, both Director Ocker and Senator Ayotte publically agreed
that more accurate information regarding wait times and appointment preferences is key,
along with a simpler and more transparent system to create ease of use for patients.
Although involvement in response to the problematic VA report is important,
New Hampshire Senator Ayotte, along with Senator Jeanne Shaheen, have also worked
proactively to help increase the quality of care for veterans within the state and beyond.
Both serve on the Senate Armed Forces Committee, and have been extremely active in
legislating different options for veterans seeking care. Together, the two Senators have
put together the Veterans Choice Program, which aims to give veterans more choices in
just where exactly they get their treatment.
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In early 2014, Senators Ayottee and Shaheen began to promote the idea of
Veterans Choice as a new program that allows “veterans to see a doctor outside the
Veteran Affairs system,” and have since “introduced legislation to make the program
permanent in several states” (Kime 1). Veterans Choice was approved by Congress in
August 2014, and is designed to reduce the lengthy wait that veterans often face when
trying to access VA-provided medical care. Despite intentions for the program, Senators
Ayotte and Shaheen fear that Veterans Choice is currently underutilized because of a lack
of understanding, and a lack of awareness. This system could be especially important to
states with no full-service VA hospital, which, in addition to New Hampshire, includes
Hawaii and Alaska.
The Veterans Choice Program, while designed to make care and treatment easier
for veterans by allowing them to “receive care in their communities, rather than at VA
hospitals,” has had some roadblocks (Sutherland). A central tenet of Veterans Choice is
that it uses a private contractor, Health Net, to manage the healthcare payments of the
program. Since the fruition of Veterans Choice, users have voiced their complaints about
the program, and Health Net specifically, citing the issue of complexity, as well as
“delays in payments from Veterans Choice” (Sutherland).
In April of 2016, Senators Ayotte and Shaheen wrote a letter to the CEO of
Health Net in order to make progressive changes to improve the access of care for
veterans. The letter emphasizes the disappointment regarding the fact that Health Net’s
“implementation of the VCP [Veterans Choice Program] has thus far failed to adequately
deliver veterans in the state of New Hampshire…access to care as envisioned by the law”
(Heath 1). Specifically, the letter discusses the problems of poor quality calls,
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inadequately trained representatives, and insufficient recordkeeping that make
participation in the program difficult for veterans. At a public forum on the subject, held
by the aforementioned Director Danielle Ocker later that same month, she discusses these
efforts, telling veterans that the Medical Center is “working very closely with Health
Net” to resolve challenges based on the demand of payments, and that both groups “are
working very closely with [their] Congressional partners” to continue the efforts toward
ease of care (Sutherland).
In looking to additional recent events, the 2016 Senatorial race between
Republican incumbent Ayotte and then-Governor Maggie Hassan continued to highlight
veterans issues and New Hampshire government actors’ proposed dedication to them.
Kelly Ayotte, wife of an Iraq War veteran, used her bipartisan experience with
Democratic Senator Shaheen to run on the platform of her previous accomplishments
regarding Veterans Choice. This program, her campaign asserted, is especially important
to New Hampshire, a state where the “large veteran population” is forced “to travel long
distances and across state lines to receive treatment,” due to the fact that there is “no fullservice VA hospital” (“Veterans”). Senator Ayotte also focused her efforts on improving
the access that veterans living in the northern areas of New Hampshire have to care,
claiming that “her efforts led the VA to approve the opening of VA health care cites in
Colebrook and Berlin,” which “will help serve more than 2,500 veterans” (“Veterans”).
Additionally, Senator Ayotte also cited her various acts helping veterans with brain
injuries and mental health care; these efforts, she asserted, would not dwindle in the face
of another term in office.
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Governor Maggie Hassan, the eventual winner of the Congressional race, focused
not only on her accomplishments, but also on her military supporters; with the creation of
the Veterans for Maggie Leadership Council, military leaders such as retired Major
General Ken Clark and retired Brigadier General Jim Smith, a former US Ambassador to
Saudi Arabia, threw their support behind Governor Hassan. Additionally, Governor
Hassan brought to light the fact that she signed a budget allowing for “the expansion of
the dementia wing at the State Veterans home, secured funding for an additional veterans
service officer at the state Office of Veterans Services,” and signed legislation that
permanently legitimized a PTSD commission (“RELEASE: Maggie for NH”).
In terms of moving into the future after Governor Hassan’s victory, she has
promised to prioritize the continuation of VA reform, as well as the efforts “to eliminate
VA wait list errors, protect whistleblowers who bring VA problems to light, push for
ongoing random audits of VA hospitals, and hold accountable those responsible for
problems at the VA” (“RELEASE: Maggie for NH”). Overall, she highlights the
importance of holding the VA responsible and increasing the accessibility and ease of use
regarding programs that already exist for veterans.
Although the stances and actions of elected officials are important in the fight to
improve veteran care in New Hampshire, these politicians are not the only actors who are
involved. Special types of lobbying take place in a context that is not within the
governmental system; this is known as outside lobbying. This “occurs when organized
interests attempt to influence elected representatives indirectly by influencing the
attitudes and/or behavior of citizens” who are involved in the policy issue (Hall and
Anderson 399). In an attempt to mobilize citizens and related audiences, these efforts can
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include endeavors such as: public ad campaigns, education programs, and various webbased approaches, to name a few.
Examples of outside lobbying can be found in the array of interest groups
throughout New Hampshire that help to do a part. One of these is the Easter Seals
program called Veterans Count; this group pledges to serve military members, veterans,
and their families, and to respond “rapidly, efficiently, and effectively to the unmet
needs” of these people in order “to ensure that they can thrive in their communities”
(Veterans Count). The organization holds various events such as auctions, races, and
dinners in order to raise funds, awareness, and volunteer participation for veterans across
the state.
An additional group that aims to serve this population is Liberty House, which is
located in Manchester, New Hampshire. The house, which opened in 2004, aims to help
homeless veterans in the transition to rejoining communities and living fulfilled lives.
Made of a team of employees and volunteers, “veterans at Liberty House…work together
to rebuild confidence, enhance their skills, and lead fulfilling, substance-free lives”
(Liberty House). The organization also holds various food drives and fundraisers, such as
a veteran’s breakfast, to collect money and to spread the word about veterans in need.
As previously stated, the types of actors who aim to make a difference in this area
of interest in policy are not limited by any means; in addition to elected officials and
interest groups and organizations, individual people and their efforts also play a role. One
such example can be found in Roger Wilkins, the Director of the New Hampshire Branch
of Concerned Veterans for America. At a local level, Wilkins has been especially active
in problem areas, helping Concerned Veterans for America to host various events, like
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barbeques and campaigns with local businesses. In addition to this, Wilkins has voiced
his concerns regarding problems at the bigger level. In his analysis, when “realizing the
massive scale of the problem,” it becomes clear that reforms requiring an “increase [in]
transparency” as well as employee accountability are crucial in increasing VA care not
only in New Hampshire, but in the United States, as well (Wilkins). In these efforts,
Wilkins and his state branch of Concerned Veterans for America have helped to project
important information, not just regarding current happenings, but also focusing on the
fundamental wrongdoings that make veteran care such a broad, challenging issue.
Another example of individual actors in the realm of veteran care in New
Hampshire can be found in publically-dubbed “power couple” Dan and Renée Plummer.
In an effort to help veterans suffering from addiction problems, the couple launched “an
endowment fund” in early 2016 “to provide money needed to ensure that veterans have
access to substance abuse services” (McMenemy). A cooperative effort with other actors
such as Easter Seals and Senator Ayotte, the fund aims to raise half a million dollars. In
addition to the endowment fund, Renée Plummer has also teamed up with radio host and
former WMUR Director Jack Health to form Hospitals for Heroes.
The idea of Hospitals for Heroes is built upon the strong private and nonprofit
health sector in New Hampshire. With a robust health infrastructure made up of
approximately 33 hospitals, many “have been screaming for years that they want to serve
our veterans” (Chidester). As a result, some of these hospitals have been brought together
to help “gather the medical community together and advocate for change” and the public
knowledge of non-VA healthcare options that may be closer to home (Chidester).
Hospitals for Heroes, while still technically in the making, aims to increase the efficiency
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of Health Net in approving appointments and coverage in a timely manner, as well as
making sure that veterans have a choice in where they receive the care that they need.
Additionally, one thing that sets Hospitals for Heroes apart is the focus on creating “an
aggressive public outreach to let local veterans know they are accepted for care and their
providers are pre-approved for coverage” (Chidester).

CONCLUSION – THEORY VERSUS REALITY
Before jumping into the advantages found in interest group theory, some
negatives must first be discussed. If public opinion is any indicator, it is clear that the VA
is an organization that has, both historically and recently, been pummeled with corruption
and distrust. In regards to previously discussed theory, Schattschneider’s opinion of a
group’s audience as a decisive force seems particularly relevant. In claiming that
outcomes of group agendas are tied to the severity of public involvement, it goes without
saying that the case of veteran rights is one that is important to many people. Therefore,
the conflict becomes more severe. With this comes a public fear that has been more than
realized, with the finding of secret lists, agendas, and various types of medical and
administrative malpractice. Under this logic, it would seem to be true that in avoiding
conflict with a very dependent public body, the VA and its branches have turned to
privatization as opposed to open, transparent operations.
No amount of scholarly arguing or evidence-gathering can nullify the harm done
by many bodies of the VA. In short, what is done is done. However, in examining the
future, one does not have to be bound by Schattschneider’s rather negative view of
interest group politics. Many transparent, smaller actors, whether publically elected
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officials, devoted interest groups, or benevolent individuals have helped to bring into
light the behind-the-scenes wrongdoings; it is here that Truman’s argument regarding the
strength and importance of interest groups flourishes. With the allowance of time,
organization, and unification, groups are allowed to plan, discuss, and socialize with each
other and with the concerned public, including the veterans themselves. Under these
conditions, and learning from past experiences, both scholars and citizens can learn more
about the political activities of interest groups, and all levels of government can learn
how to benefit from their actions; this pinpoints the usefulness of interest group theory in
regards to a positive shift of policy.
In reference to the growth of interests groups themselves, as studied by
Schlozman and Tierney, their findings are qualitatively proven. With the progression of
technology, globalization, and communication, various groups aimed at addressing
individual causes continue to pop up. Once only addressed by the VA, the fight for
veterans’ rights is now furthered by groups like Veterans Count, Liberty House, and
Concerned Veterans for America. Additionally, these groups use a plethora of methods
regarding public outreach and communication, varying from public awareness
campaigns, to dinner fundraisers, and everything in between. Of course, with the growth
of the Internet and social media, awareness of the events and of the groups themselves
can only continue to grow. While more conventional actors also have access to these
resources, the plethora of groups acting at specific, local, highly-individualized levels can
bring together people of all types more effectively.
In discussing Nownes’ work on state level interest groups, his point regarding
political cultures playing a role in interest activity can be seen, and it is here that the
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notion of New Hampshire as a change-maker is demonstrated. As discussed in a
previously-cited 2016 editorial by Jeff Chidester, New Hampshire can be seen as a
ground for leadership in veteran care; a lot of the reasons that Chidester cites can be tied
to political culture, as discussed by Nownes. First, Chidester claims that New
Hampshire’s lack of a full-service VA hospital makes veteran care a more dire issue in
New Hampshire than it is in other states, as veterans are forced to travel far distances.
The lack of a full-service VA hospital has definitely been a hot topic within veteranrelated politics in New Hampshire, and has become a spark for more and more calls for
change.
Additionally, Chidester makes claims that New Hampshire’s first-in-the-nation
primary, as well as its Senatorial ties to relevant committees, such as the Senate Armed
Forces Committee, give the state great political leverage in championing the catalytic
action for veterans that the United States needs. Furthermore, as mentioned in the
discussion regarding Hospitals for Heroes, New Hampshire’s strong, non-profit health
infrastructure allows for increased qualifications regarding the advancement of veteran
care. In Chidester’s analysis, Nownes’ ideas of political cultures and interests groups can
clearly be seen, emphasizing the fact that New Hampshire is a prime place for veteran
care to grow. The diverse blend of characteristics is a platform that is unique to the state,
and makes the role of these homegrown actors even more effective.
Lastly, in the examination of policy entrepreneurs, an argument can be made for
elected officials as agents of this type of change. As Mintrom and Norman claim, these
actors can be in government or out of it; the importance is not in their position, but in
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their devotion to the cause and how they express it. In examining the efforts of Senators
Ayotte and Shaheen, their roles as policy entrepreneurs are legitimate.
Mintrom and Norman’s first element that depicts policy entrepreneurs is social
acuity. It is clear that both Senators have worked in a bipartisan manner, taking time to
comprehend and understand ideas from a variety of sources. In reference to the second
element, problem definition, Senator Ayotte especially has used both her professional
perspective as a U.S. Senator, and her personal perspective as a military dependent to
relate problems to her own interests. One could argue that this relation has played a part
in her influential involvement, both in creating legislation, and in regularly visiting the
New Hampshire VA Medical Center. This has also helped to fulfill the third element of
Mintrom and Norman’s idea of a policy entrepreneur, which is building teams. In short,
the more involved one is at different levels, the more connections one makes, therefore
expanding the team. Lastly, the fourth element of policy entrepreneurs is that they lead by
example; in their endeavors, Senators Shaheen and Ayotte have lead not only New
Hampshire, but the United States, in creating and sponsoring legislation for veterans all
across the country, with their Veterans Choice Program. It is here that we see that policy
entrepreneurs, no matter the weight given to their professional role, all have the potential
to be associated with interest group theory, as they fight to pursue the strengthening of
their cause.
After analysis, scholarly thought can be seen as applicable to the environment of
veterans’ rights in New Hampshire and around the country; additionally, many pluralist
theories emphasize the fact that the role of these interest-based actors makes a significant
difference where other, conventional actors struggle to progress. While the actions of
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these interests are without a doubt beneficial and based in benevolent intentions, it brings
to light the overall issue. Grassroots groups or individuals who conduct outside lobbying
tactics help the cause – but they should not be taking the brunt of the responsibility.
Unfortunately, it seems that this is the case as of late. Veterans Choice, though
intended to make the plight of veterans easier, has acted as a clogged system thus far. In
addition, as seen through both historical and contemporary records of the VA, problems
continue to plague federal efforts. While groups and coalitions such as Veterans Count,
Liberty House, and Hospitals for Heroes help veterans at individual levels or aspire to do
so in the future, certain aspects, such as funding, are simply not at the prevalent level to
make the difference that is ultimately needed. This is not meant to belittle or demean the
efforts of these actors; on the contrary, they are admirable in the face of government and
bureaucratic struggle. However, they cannot be counted on to carry this responsibility for
much longer, both for their own sake, and for the sake of New Hampshire veterans.
After discussion, it is clear that the scholars of interest group and pluralistic
political theory make claims that uphold the relativeness of the fight for increased
veterans’ rights. Additionally, under this analysis, it can be seen that New Hampshire is
an excellent place for potential change to take off, despite the aforementioned challenges.
With political characteristics as broad as being the first primary in the nation, and ties as
individual as Senatorial family military involvement, when combined with the spark of
interest-group involvement, New Hampshire depicts a cooperative environment with
great room for change, and even more room for compassion.
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